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The relationships between basic and applied agricultural R&D, developed and developing
country R&D and between R&D, extension, technology and productivity growth are outlined.
The declining growth rates of public R&D expenditures are related to output growth and crop
yields, where growth rates have also fallen, especially in the developed countries. However,
growth in output value per hectare has not declined in the developing countries and labour prod-
uctivity growth has increased except in the EU. Total factor productivity has generally increased,
however it is measured. The public sector share of R&D expenditures has fallen and there has
been rapid concentration in the private sector, where six multinationals now dominate. These
companies are accumulating intellectual property to an extent that the public and international
institutions are disadvantaged. This represents a threat to the global commons in agricultural
technology on which the green revolution has depended. Estimates of the increased R&D expen-
ditures needed to feed 9 billion people by 2050 and how these should be targeted, especially by
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), show that the amounts
are feasible and that targeting sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia can best increase output
growth and reduce poverty. Lack of income growth in SSA is seen as the most insoluble
problem.
Keywords: agricultural R&D; technology; productivity growth1. INTRODUCTION
Since the Second World War increasing agricultural
productivity allowed food output to more than keep
pace with demand, so that the long-term trend in
prices was downward. This resulted from the application
of science to agriculture on the biological side, first in
the developed countries (DCs), but with a considerable
public sector interest that ensured the transmission to
less developed countries (LDCs). It also led to the
success of the green revolution. But since 2008, rising
food prices have swept away the apathy that had
caused the neglect of agriculture over the last two
decades (Piesse & Thirtle 2009; see the electronic
supplementary material, table 1 and glossary).
Thus, §2 outlines the way in which R&D generates
new technologies and extension transmits them to
farmers, increasing productivity domestically and
internationally. This encompasses the role of ther for correspondence (c.thirtle@ic.ac.uk).
e Government Office for Science commissioned this review,
s are those of the author(s), are independent of Government,
not constitute Government policy.
ic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/
/rstb.2010.0140 or via http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org.
tribution of 23 to a Theme Issue ‘Food security: feeding the
2050’.
3035DCs in generating basic advances that spill over to
the developing counties and the role of extension ser-
vices in the dissemination of technology.
Section 3 addresses international comparisons of
R&D expenditures and different measures of prod-
uctivity growth. Increases in yields are crucial to
output growth, but labour productivity growth is
dominant in the DCs and is most closely correlated
with wages and incomes in the LDCs. Labour prod-
uctivity increases as human labour is replaced first by
animal and then mechanical power, which has been
driven predominantly by private sector R&D. These
partial measures do not take account of this substi-
tution process, but total factor productivity (TFP)
indices do. TFP also distinguishes between technical
progress, efficiency change and input intensification,
so TFP growth has different implications, according
to its cause.
Section 4 explains the effects of the expansion of pri-
vate R&D, biotechnology and patents, which have
together led to a rapid concentration in the sector, so
that there are now less than half a dozen major produ-
cers of new varieties. This represents a threat to the
public good nature of agricultural technology on
which the green revolution was based. Section 5 reports
estimates of the levels of agricultural investment that
would be needed to end hunger by 2025. The
conclusion summarizes and evaluates the evidence.This journal is # 2010 The Royal Society
Table 1. Acronyms.
acronym definition
Bt Bacillus thuringiensis
CGIAR Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research
CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement
Centre (English translation)
DCs developed countries
FSU former Soviet Union
GDP gross domestic product
GM genetically modified
GPG global public good
IPRs intellectual property rights
IRR internal rate of return
LAC Latin America and Caribbean
LDCs less developed countries
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MNCs multinational companies
MTA material transfer agreement
NARS national agricultural research systems
NIEs newly industrializing economies
R&D research and development
ROR rate of return
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
TFP total factor productivity
TRIPS agreement on trade related aspects of
intellectual property rights
WDR World Development Report
WEMA water-efficient maize for Africa
WTO World Trade Organization
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GROWTH
The two simplest productivity measures are partial:
yield and the average product of labour. New data
from Alston et al. (2008) show that for the US,
between 1866 and 2007 average yields of maize
increased by a factor of 6 and wheat yields by a
factor of 3.5. In 2002, US agricultural production
was more than five times its 1910 level. The increase
in output from 1910 to 2002 was 1.82 per cent per
year, achieved with only a 0.36 per cent per year
increase in aggregate inputs. Thus, from 1911 to
2002, yields increased by a factor of 4.4, labour prod-
uctivity by a factor of 15.3 and TFP by a factor of 4.1.
Similarly, by the early 1980s in the UK, the labour
input required to produce crops like potatoes, sugar
beet, wheat and barley was only one-tenth the 1930
level, and over the same period wheat yields increased
by a factor of 3 (Grigg 1989). From the Second
World War to the early 1980s, tractor horse-
power increased more than ten-fold and nitrogen
fertilizer application grew by a factor of 6 (Holderness
1985).
These achievements required massive and sustained
expenditures on R&D. The US expenditures are
recorded by Huffman & Evenson (1992) and those
for the UK by Thirtle et al. (1997). The review of
the literature on the returns to R&D by Alston et al.
(2000) leaves no doubt that R&D expenditures have
led to these productivity gains. For the developing
countries, the average internal rate of return (IRR) is
43 per cent. Evenson (2001) similarly reviewed aPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)large number of studies and found the IRR to be
above 40 per cent but with a large variance. These
results are generally taken to be evidence of under-
investment in agricultural R&D and Evenson shows
that the same is true for extension.
Much of the improvement in plant materials was the
work of the public sector, while mechanical innovations
have been mostly attributable to private R&D. The dif-
fusion of both biological and mechanical innovations
takes many years, so there is a lag between the R&D
expenditures and the productivity gains at the farm
level that can be 25 to 40 years. R&D produces yield
gains at the trial plot level, which then require
expenditures on extension to take them to the farmer.
Then, since more educated farmers are generally
better at screening and adapting new technologies,
farmer education plays a role. There is also good evi-
dence that spillovers between research jurisdictions are
as important as direct benefits within countries
(Schimmelpfennig & Thirtle 1999). The relationship
between public and private R&D has been less studied,
but it seems probable that the two are complements
rather than substitutes (Thirtle et al. 2004). The
relationship between basic and applied research was
pioneered by Evenson et al. (1979) and the lags
between basic and applied research and diffusion are
modelled in Thirtle et al. (1998).
The international transmission of productivity-
enhancing technologies depends on the rate at which
new technology becomes available, the extent to
which it is allowed and encouraged to spill over into
other jurisdictions and the capacity of the recipient
countries to identify, customize and diffuse it. Hayami &
Ruttan (1985) give an account of the development of
sugarcane varieties that starts with Evenson & Kislev
(1975) on the relationship between basic and applied
science, continues with plant breeding and continues
into the international diffusion of genetic material and
research capacity.
The productivity gain will be limited by the weakest
link in this chain, but from 1961 when data became
available, the international system saw public R&D
growing at an increasing rate in both DCs and
LDCs. This generated substantial yield growth in the
DCs and the new varieties could be fairly quickly
adapted by the LDCs. There is technology on the
shelf for the countries that follow the leaders, and
LDCs with good research and extension resources can
prosper under these circumstances. However, extension
and simple adaptive research lack the glamour of path-
breaking new technologies and are often neglected.
Agricultural extension has attracted relatively little
attention in the past two decades and there is a serious
lack of data for most LDCs. The only compilation is
Swanson et al. (1991), which does not extend past
1988 and has much missing data. However, Anderson &
Feder (2007) estimate the number of extension per-
sonnel in the world is about half a million, of which
80 per cent are public sector and 396 000 are in
LDCs where they outnumber research scientists by
as many as 20 : 1. The regional distribution of workers
in the developing countries is in need of updating
but, based on Swanson et al. (1990, p.56) data on
public-sector employees is in table 2.
Table 2. LDC extension personnel. Source: Anderson &
Feder (2007).
developing region total extension personnel (’000)
Latin America 28
Middle East-North Africa 34
Asia 277
sub-Saharan Africa 57
total developing countries 396
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been an issue, as critics suggested that many of these
workers had nothing to extend owing to weak R&D.
Also, extension has tended to be the poor relation at
the bottom of the funding chain (Thirtle & van Zyl
1994). This resulted in entire budgets being spent on
recurrent items like salaries, while there was no fuel
for vehicles and hence no farm visits.
Despite these concerns Evenson’s (2001) survey of
the impact of extension services showed a median
IRR of 80 per cent, but with a large variance. This
study covered the available work from 1970 to the
early 1990s, which fitted production functions with
extension as an explanatory variable for output or
yields. The problem with this technique, which
accounts for most rate of return (ROR) studies on
R&D, is that many covariates are omitted and hence
the researchers find just what they are looking for: a
positive and significant elasticity for extension or
R&D. As studies have become more sophisticated,
especially by allowing for international spillovers of
technology (Schimmelpfennig & Thirtle 1999), RORs
have fallen to more reasonable levels of around 30 per
cent. Evenson & Pingali (2007) took a different
approach, showing that whereas there was correlation
between research scientists and the adoption of green
revolution modern varieties, there was no correlation
with extension officers. Many countries with an abun-
dance of extension personnel did not have a green
revolution.
This suggests that the causes of failure and success
in extension need to be examined and this challenge
was taken up by Feder et al. (2001), who suggest
there are some generic and universal difficulties in
the operation of public extension systems and in the
bureaucratic–political environment within which they
are budgeted and managed. They find eight factors
that can cause deficient performance: the scale and
complexity of extension operations; the dependence of
success on the broader policy environment; the prob-
lems that stem from the less than ideal interaction of
extension with the knowledge generation system; the
difficulties inherent in tracing extension impact; the
profound problems of accountability; the oftentimes
weak political commitment and support for public
extension; the frequent encumbrance with public
duties in addition to those related to knowledge trans-
fer; and the severe difficulties of fiscal unsustainability
faced in many countries.
Anderson & Feder (2007) offer solutions to
problems with training-and-visit extension, decentra-
lized mechanisms for delivery, fee-for-service and
privatized extension, and farmer field schools. TheirPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)review emphasizes the efficiency gains that can come
from locally decentralized delivery with incentive struc-
tures based on largely private provision, much of which
will inevitably remain largely publicly funded, especially
for impoverished developing countries.3. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF R&D
AND PRODUCTIVITY
In the 1950s and 1960s science was applied to agricul-
ture in the DCs, with rapidly rising R&D expenditures
and productivity growth, whether measured by yields,
labour productivity or TFP. During the 1960s and
1970s this process was extended to the LDCs, as the
green revolution raised yields, especially in the densely
populated countries of Asia. The DCs have good data
that have been used to substantiate the claims made
above. Obviously, the DCs are responsible for much
of the food that is traded, and basic R&D in the
DCs should spill over and play a role in LDC pro-
ductivity. The data for the rest of the world are less
detailed, but it is possible to assess the changes in
R&D and productivity for both the DCs and the
LDCs.
(a) R&D expenditures in rich and poor nations
In the longer term, supply response depends on the
availability of appropriate technology. Public R&D
expenditures for the high-income countries fell from
10 534 million constant 2000 international US$ in
1991 to 10 191 million in 2000 (Pardey et al. 2006).
This fall is minor, but R&D was also retargeted
towards public interest areas such as the environment
and food safety so the allocation to productivity enhan-
cing research declined substantially (Alston et al.
1999). The decline in the high income countries’
R&D expenditures is shown in figure 1, which sum-
marizes the world situation. The figure shows that
the rate of growth of agricultural R&D expenditures
has declined everywhere since the first period.
These regional trends hide a growing divide
between the scientific haves and have-nots. In the
Asia-Pacific region, just two countries, China and
India, accounted for 89 per cent of the $42.5 billion
increase in regional spending from 1995 to 2000.
Thus, China and India accounted for 59 per cent of
the region’s scientific spending in 1995, jumping to
73 per cent by 2000. While these huge national agri-
cultural research systems (NARS) are successful,
partly because the multinationals will collaborate to
gain access to large markets (Pray et al. 2007),
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has suffered from what
Lipton & Longhurst (1989) called the Balkanization
of research. There are marked returns to scale and
the NARS of small countries fare poorly. In SSA the
growth rate in full time staff since 1960 has been 4
per cent per annum and 75 per cent have post-graduate
training and the remaining 25 per cent have doctorates.
The proportion of expatriates has declined from 90 per
cent in 1960 to 2 per cent in 2000, which is amazing,
but the combination of HIV/AIDS and higher private
sector salaries has left many NARS short of staff.
SSA has always lagged so far behind that it is only
now showing signs of increased growth. This is
declining productivity growth
growth rates of yields for major cereals in
developing countries are slowing
Soruce: World development report (2008)
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Figure 2. Developing country productivity growth rates for major cereals. Source: World Development Report (WDR; World
Bank 2008).
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Figure 1. World R&D expenditures by region and income level in 2000 international US$.
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infrastructure, and more robust systems of governance,
all of which are allowing the backlog of available
technology to be exploited.
(b) Output, crop yields and animal
improvements
The World Development Report (WDR; World Bank
2008) states that developing countries achieved much
faster agricultural growth (2.6% a year) than industrial
countries (0.9% a year) from 1980 to 2004, account-
ing for 79 per cent of growth. Their share of world
agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) rose from
56 per cent in 1980 to 65 per cent in 2004, with the
newly industrializing economies (NIEs) in Asia
accounting for two-thirds of the developing world’s
agricultural growth. The major contributor to growthPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)in Asia, and the developing world in general, was pro-
ductivity gains rather than expansion of land devoted
to agriculture. Cereal yields in East Asia rose by an
impressive 2.8 per cent a year in 1961–2004, much
more than the 1.8 per cent growth in industrial
countries. Only in SSA did area expansion have
more impact than growth in yields.
The FAO (2007) and USDA (2009) both report
yields for individual crops, measured in physical
terms. The World Bank (2007) data are in terms of
agricultural value added per hectare, in constant 2000
US$, which obviously allows for enterprise switching
and includes all outputs, such as animals and animal
products. Figure 2 shows that for the most important
cereal crops the growth rates in the developing countries
were 3 per cent or better at the height of the green
revolution in the early 1980s. Since then growth rates
Table 3. Yield growth rates—all grains. Calculated from
USDA (2009). Note: these growth rates were measured by
regressing the natural logarithm of yield on time. The values
marked* indicate growth is not significantly different from
zero.
regions
1961–
2008
1961–
1985
1986–
2008
developed countries
North America 1.834 2.08 2.00
Oceania 0.969 0.65 20.059*
European Union 1.779 2.86 0.80
former Soviet Union 1.237 1.78 0.518*
Europe (non-EU) 1.485 3.45 0.326*
developed country
average
1.46 2.16 0.72
less developed countries
North Africa 2.079 1.45 2.10
sub-Saharan Africa 0.017* 0.47 0.96
South America 2.218 1.63 3.15
Caribbean 1.43 2.51 0.62
Central America 1.46 2.16 0.40
East Asia 2.86 3.90 1.49
Middle East 1.914 2.13 1.83
South Asia 2.353 2.24 2.15
South-East Asia 1.912 2.08 1.43
less developed
countries average
2.10 2.50 1.57
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were about 1 per cent and maize a little better at around
1.5 per cent. There seems to be a slight recovery since
2000, which is surely needed as these growth rates are
less than population growth and per capita food avail-
ability would be falling.
The calculations in this study are split pre- and
post-1985 as that was the year at which a downturn
in growth rates seemed to begin (table 3). Even so,
the results show that all Africa is doing substantially
better and South America almost doubling yields in
the second period. These positive results need to be
set against decline in the other six regions, which
reduces LDC yield growth overall from 2.5 to 1.6
per cent. However, this performance is good relative
to the DCs, where growth rates have fallen to one-
third of their pre-1986 levels and thus the greater
decline in the DC’s R&D growth is possibly a cause
of the greater decline in yield growth.
But other factors need to be considered, too. The
gains from hybrids and the green revolution-type tech-
nologies were exploited earlier in the DCs, so by the
second period progress may be more difficult. Note,
too, that North America, which is exploiting the
major new technology, genetically modified (GM)
crops, has no significant fall in yields, whereas the
other DCs who are reluctant so far to embrace this
science, are doing extremely poorly.
As a general proposition, the low-yield growth in the
DCs must mean there will be less technology available
to the LDCs in the future, so the falling yield growth in
Asia may reflect this. Africa is further behind and has
not yet reached this point in the sequence of diffusion.
The work on spillovers suggests clear patterns, andPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)within agricultural economics Schimmelpfennig &
Thirtle (1999) found there was a cascade effect for
the US and the EU. The direction of spillovers was
from the US to Northern Europe, from there to Italy
and from Italy to the least technologically advanced
EU countries such as Greece. This suggests that the
lags could be very long. SSA may be able to continue
finding technologies for a long time before catching
up with Asia, as Asia slows owing to fewer spillovers
from the US and Europe. The very large and successful
NARS of China, India and Brazil, which benefit from
substantial economies of scale, will play an increasing
role in technology diffusion.
Productivity in the livestock sector is becoming
increasingly important, as with higher incomes the
expenditure share of meat, eggs, milk (and fruit and
vegetables) rises. Evenson (2001) has shown that prod-
uctivity growth in the US has always been slow in
extensive livestock, but where feed concentrates and
selective breeding can be applied, as in pigs and poultry,
yield growth can be as fast as in crops. Conradie et al.
(2009) show that in South Africa, productivity growth
in chicken production accounts for the most rapid
increases in the Western Cape. Although productivity-
enhancing livestock research is not further considered
explicitly, it is included in §3c, which measures land
productivity in value terms, regardless of use.(c) Land and labour productivity
The yields above are measured in physical terms, but
the World development indicators data (World Bank
2007) are published with yields measured in value
added per hectare, at constant 2000 US$. This incor-
porates all outputs and does allow for crop switching,
so it may give lower or higher yield growth than the
FAO crop level data. It has also been used to estimate
labour productivity for Africa and Asia (Thirtle &
Piesse 2008). The averages for both land and labour
productivity were calculated by regressing the prod-
uctivity measure on time using a random coefficients
model to give an average for the region.
The regional averages are in table 4, starting with
the yield for all three groups of developing countries,
by continent, which is much the same sample as all
the LDCs in table 3. This average yield is lower in
the first period at 1.7 per cent, but instead of falling,
rises slightly in the second period. Either enterprises
other than basic cereals have done better, or switching
to higher valued production has contributed to the
increase in output value, or both. The Asia average
for 1961–2006 of 2.6 per cent is above that for
Africa (2%) but this is far higher than expected,
given that African agriculture is regarded as failing.
Over half the African sample (22 of the 42 countries)
had yield growth of over 2 per cent and only eight
had less than 1 per cent. Latin America and the Carib-
bean (LAC) have lower yield growth, but again no
decline. Thirtle & Piesse (2008) did not include the
DCs, but the last row in this section shows that the
former Soviet Union (FSU) and non-EU countries
in Europe actually had poorer yield growth than the
developing countries.
Table 4. Growth in yields and labour productivity using
value added data (%). Source: Thirtle & Piesse (2008).
All growth rates are significantly different from zero.
region
1961–
2003
1961–
1985
1985–
2003
yields
Africa, Asia, Latin
America and
Caribbean
1.79 1.70 1.79
Africa and Asia 2.14 1.55 2.27
Africa 2.00 1.37 2.11
Asia 2.60 2.14 2.75
Latin America and
Caribbean
1.22 1.27 1.36
FSU and Europe
non-EU
0.54 1.94 0.55
labour productivity
Africa 0.40 0.015 0.80
Asia 1.50 1.34 1.56
Latin America and
Caribbean
1.35 1.51 1.48
Europe
non-EU 3.36 3.00 3.40
EU 4.13 4.93 3.41
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Asia translated into labour productivity, growing at an
average of 1.5 per cent, with only five of the 12
countries having less than 1 per cent growth. For
Africa, labour productivity grew at only 0.4 per cent
per annum and although the top few countries are in
the same league as Asia, almost half the sample
(18 countries) actually have negative growth in
labour productivity.
This problem has not attracted the attention it
deserves. Labour productivity is also crucial to food
security because 70 per cent of the poor are rural,
and agricultural wages, incomes and poverty reduction
are dependent on the productivity of the labour force.
The common view is that by 2050 total food output
will be sufficient, but there will be extreme insecurity
because the poor in SSA will not be producing
sufficient food or have enough income to buy it.
There is a clear contrast between the poorest
countries and both Europe groups, EU and non-EU,
which have rather more than twice as much labour prod-
uctivity growth. This again follows from the induced
innovation hypothesis, as labour is the scarce resource
in the DCs. It also fits the view that labour productivity
is closely linked to incomes, as Europe, especially the
EU member states, is substantially better off.
The poorest countries are all still predominantly agri-
cultural, while the richest have now moved beyond
being purely industrial to being economies dominated
by the service sector. The greatest empirical regularity
in economics is the structural transformation, whereby
during the development process agriculture declines
in importance relative first to industry and later
to services. Labour productivity does not increase
dramatically until a country has passed the turning
point in the structural transformation, at which the
total numbers employed in agriculture start to fall.
When countries pass the turning point, their economiesPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)change dramatically. Labour productivity in agriculture
has to increase rapidly enough for the falling rural and
agricultural population to feed the growing urban,
industrial labour force. China passed the turning
point some years ago and the agricultural population
has been declining since 1999. India too has reached
the turning point.
These changes have serious implications for the rate
and direction of technical change in agriculture. Bio-
logical technical change may continue, but it is quite
quickly outweighed by mechanical technical change.
In China and India, which comprise over 40 per cent
of the world population, labour productivity in agricul-
ture will now grow rapidly and so will agricultural
incomes.
The problem is that no countries in SSA, except
South Africa, have reached the turning point and
there seems to be no means of transforming labour
incomes at this stage of development. Worse still,
labour productivity is a two-edged sword. Inappropri-
ate labour saving technology simply increases the
numbers of beggars, as early machinery imports in
South Asia showed. However, there are some suc-
cesses. Herbicide-tolerant GM maize was developed
in the US to save labour, but in SSA it has been
used with minimum tillage in a way that has reduced
erosion and increased area and yields rather than
reducing employment (Piesse et al. 2009).(d) Total factor productivity
Lack of data on input prices prevents the construction
of TFP indices using accounting or index number
methods. The alternative is programming techniques,
such as data envelopment analysis, which allows the
use of the Malmquist index. However, this is con-
structed by comparing each observation with the best
practice frontier that is determined from all the obser-
vations, so the choice of the peer group changes the
index for each country.
The index number alternative is followed by Avila &
Evenson (2007), who dealt with the lack of data for
share weights by applying values from Brazil and
India to all the other LDCs. They apply the share
weights calculated for India to Africa and Asia, and
those for Brazil to Latin American and the middle
income countries. Fuglie (2008) extends this by
including China, Indonesia, Japan, the UK and the
US as sources of shares, so that the allocation is
slightly less crude. For example, the estimates for
Brazil were applied to LAC, the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region and South Africa. The
estimates for India were applied to other countries
in South Asia as well as SSA except South Africa.
The US shares were used for the FSU and the
1967–1990 UK shares (from Thirtle & Bottomley
1992) were used for all of Europe except the USSR.
Fuglie (2008) finds no evidence of a general slow-
down in TFP growth from 1970 to 2006. Indeed,
the world TFP up to 1989 grew at 0.87 per cent per
annum and since 1990 has grown at 1.56 per cent
per annum. He also notes that for maize, rice and
wheat yield growth fell from 2.29 to 1.35 per cent
per annum and output per hectare from 1.96 per
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rose from 1.25 to 1.51 per cent per annum. The major
finding that reconciles these results is that it is input
growth that has declined, as in the extreme case of
the UK, where it was negative. TFP growth largely
offset decelerating input growth to keep the real
output of global agriculture growing at about 2 per
cent per year since the 1960s, but there was a slow-
down in the growth of agricultural investment. This
is an important finding and explains why the supply
response to the food price crisis was so strong. Lack
of investment on farms can be corrected far more
quickly than lack of new technology where the R&D
and diffusion lags are very long.
Fuglie’s (2008) results show there is no general
decline. Indeed, there is TFP growth that offsets the
decline in inputs and keeps output rising. His results
are reported by decade. For the DCs and the LDCs,
USSR, the FSU, Eastern Europe, LAC, North-East
Asia, China, South-East Asia and North America,
TFP growth in the 1990s and since 2000 was greater
than in the 1980s, which was an improvement on the
1970s. For western Europe, Oceania and SSA the
1990s growth was an improvement on the 1980s, but
since 2000 is lower than the 1980s. For the MENA,
South Asia and India, both recent periods show
lower growth than the 1980s. On average then, his
results are heavily biased in favour of growth rather
than decline.
Since there is evidence that yield growth may have
declined and even labour productivity growth has
slowed, it is important to note that TFP is different
exactly because it takes account of the land and
labour substitutes that are modern intermediate and
capital good inputs. Less capital investment and
chemicals will increase TFP just the same as more
output or higher land or labour productivities.
Ludena et al. (2007) use the Malmquist index to
estimate agricultural productivity growth for 116
countries and find that average annual agricultural
TFP growth increased from 0.6 per cent to 1.29 per
cent between 1961–1980 and 1981–2000. These posi-
tive results are used to forecast optimistic increases in
productivity to 2040. Most recently, Nin Pratt & Yu
(2008) have produced estimates concentrating on
SSA using the Malmquist index, but with shares con-
strained to stay within bounds derived from Avila &
Evenson (2007). This is an interesting approach, but
it may combine the best or the worst of both alterna-
tives. The results in figure 3 show that TFP was
declining in SSA until the mid 1980s, after which
there is a dramatic recovery. Up to 1985, TFP declined
at 1.67 per cent per annum but then grew at 1.73 per
cent, with a further improvement to 1.83 per cent in
the 1990s. This is in keeping with earlier Malmquist
results, such as Lusigi & Thirtle (1997), although the
technique may be inclined to have an upward bias.
Figure 4 shows TFP growth in SSA relative to Asia
and Latin America. The conflict with the index
number approach results is clear, as only Latin America
had positive growth prior to 1983, and even then it was
less than 1 per cent. Then, all the regions improve
between 1984 and 1993 and all improve again between
1994 and 2003.Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)The improvement in SSA is partly owing to better
agricultural practices, but it must be stressed that
almost all are owing to efficiency increases rather
than technological change. Many countries in SSA
now have better policies, better governance and
improved institutions and infrastructure, which have
taken them closer to the technological frontier. How-
ever, the frontier is not moving outwards, so the
R&D systems are not creating better technologies for
the future. Thus, the prospects are limited as the effi-
ciency gains will cease if the frontier is static. So Nin
Pratt & Yu (2008) take a pessimistic view in their
paper to counterbalance the optimism of Ludena
et al. (2007).
The above review is sufficient to show that there is
no consistent evidence of a decline in TFP. The
methods may be imperfect, but all suggest growth
rather than decline when using these broad sets of
data. Thus, the evidence of decline is confined to
TFP studies of individual countries, such as the UK
(Thirtle et al. 2004), which turns out to be atypical
and different even from the rest of the EU. However,
the evidence on yields was more dismal and labour
productivity is improving very slowly in SSA. This
lack of entitlements may well prove to be the least
tractable problem.(e) Sustainability, maintenance research
and environment
Although the literature concentrates on land, labour
and TFP, there are also social TFPs, which incorporate
changes in environmental quality. From the 1980s
in the UK, R&D was redirected away from
Table 5. Estimated global public & private agricultural
R&D, ca 2000. Source: Pardey et al. (2006).
expenditures, million 2000
international $ share per cent
region public private total public private
LDCs 12 819 862 13 682 93.7 6.3
DCs 10 191 12 086 22 277 45.7 54.3
total 23 010 12 948 35 958 64.0 36.0
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the environment, animal welfare and food safety, in
line with government policy. The UK disasters in
animal production and food safety, such as bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease), Creutz-
feldt–Jacob disease, Escherichia coli, foot and mouth
and Salmonella suggest that this was required. The
FAO argues that animal diseases are now transmitted
across borders owing to globalization, and with selective
breeding for performance comes higher disease risk,
which increases animal health R&D on preventive
measures and means more prophylactic pharmaceut-
icals. For livestock in South Africa, Townsend &
Thirtle (2001) showed that maintenance research
(animal health) is at least as important as productivity
enhancing research and this distinction should also be
made in the arable sector, where a substantial share of
R&D is to sustain existing yields.
In LDCs, more efficient natural resource use can
improve water productivity. For instance, drip irrigation
uses scarce water very parsimoniously and is labour-
intensive, which suits LDCs with high unemployment.
Much is expected of a Gates- and Buffet-funded initiat-
ive in which Monsanto and BASF are collaborating
with CIMMYT and several NARS to develop
water-efficient maize for Africa (WEMA; see www.
monsanto.com). The expectation is that by 2020 the
project will lead to 2 million extra tonnes of grain and
will improve the nutrition of 14–21 million poor
people. As climate change raises the incidence of
drought, the gains will obviously increase further.
Herbicide-tolerant GM white maize is already being
used with ‘planting without ploughing’ in KwaZulu
Natal, and is both high yielding and prevents soil ero-
sion (Gouse et al. 2006). Soil erosion can also be
prevented by labour intensive soil conservation
measures, even when population pressure is increas-
ing, as Tiffen et al. (1994) showed in their study of
the Machakos district of Kenya.
The oil price rises also means expensive fertilizer
and will mitigate in favour of precision agriculture to
use only the necessary modern inputs. A specific
example of what can be done is the encapsulation of
sugar beet seeds in the UK with nutrients and plant
protection chemicals, which massively reduces input
use and pollution as well as giving higher extraction
rates (Thirtle 1999). What is needed is soil and
water efficient, modern input reducing, low-emission
technologies for both DCs and LDCs. Finally,
simple improvements in storage technology can pre-
vent heavy post harvest losses and there are health
impacts, as GMmaize has been shown to have less car-
cinogenic toxins, while Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
cotton reduces hospital admissions for burns and
poisoning from pesticide sprays.(f) Precautionary R&D
Some R&D expenditures are targeted at counteracting
disasters. As crops become less genetically diverse, the
risk posed by new pests or viruses increases. Gene
banks are some insurance that other genetic material
will be available to counteract the threat. The recent
outbreaks of animal diseases suggest that the publicPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)resistance to GM crops is irrational. It is the animal
production systems that are a danger to health. In
the DCs, expenditures on preventive and reactive
R&D for mad cow disease, swine flu, foot and mouth
and Salmonella have increased. In the LDCs, the
close proximity of people and animals lies behind the
outbreaks of swine and bird flu and their transmission
to humans. At present, there is an outbreak of Rift
Valley fever in South Africa. Increased animal output
and population pressure will mean these outbreaks
should be regarded as an increasing threat in future.4. PRIVATE DOMINANCE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
INCENTIVES: THE DEMISE OF THE COMMONS
The international system that produced the results
outlined above was centred on open access to intellec-
tual property that Dalrymple (2004) called a global
public good (GPG), albeit an impure one. This is a
reasonable description of the system that was in
place from the Second World War to the end of the
millennium and it has produced some excellent pro-
gress in international productivity growth. However,
this is now increasingly under threat.(a) Growth of private R&D
Most DC research is now private while over 90 per
cent of LDC R&D is public, as shown in table 5.
Twenty years ago universities and public laboratories
in the DCs did all the basic and strategic research
and this created a global commons of intellectual
property. Now Monsanto and Syngenta lead and the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR) and the rest of the international
public systems tend to follow.
The extent of the domination of the agricultural
chemicals, seeds and biotechnology market is apparent
in table 6, which is from a survey conducted by USDA.
The ‘big six’, which are BASF, Bayer, Syngenta,
Dupont, Dow and Monsanto, together spend US$3.6
billion, compared with US$1.42 billion for the other
249 companies operating in these areas and US$4
billion for all the other areas. The total private expen-
ditures on agricultural chemicals is US$2.65 billion
and for seeds and biotechnology US$2.37 billion.
The effect of this increasing concentration is not
clear, but there is an early study of the effect of
market structure on innovation in biotechnology
(Schimmelpfennig et al. 2004).
The several meanings of the term private in the
R&D context were discussed by Thirtle & Echeverria
Table 6. Private sector firms and R&D expenditures by type
of activity. We thank Keith Fuglie of USDA for this preview
of unpublished work.
number of
companies
agricultural R&D in
2006 (billion US$)
agricultural
chemical-seed-
biotechnology
companies
‘big 6’ 2.03 þ 1.57
(chemicals þ seed &
biotechnology)
other agricultural
chemicals
122 0.62
other seed 82 0.63
other agriculture
biotech
45 0.17
farm machinery 35 1.21
animal health 118 1.58
animal and
aquaculture
genetics
61 0.26
fertilizer — 0.45
animal feed — 0.5
total 446 9.02
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tution, funded by public taxes, producing outputs that
are in the public domain, is clearly public. Historically,
this best describes the invention of biological technol-
ogies at the basic end of the science spectrum, where
patenting was not possible and a private R&D insti-
tution would have no way of appropriating the
returns to the investment. At the other extreme John
Deere, indulging in adaptive, near-market mechanical
innovations is purely private and the returns are
secured when the new tractor in which the innovation
is embodied is sold at a price that reflects its superior-
ity. Or, alternatively, other companies pay for the use
of the patented innovation. Most innovations lie some-
where between these two extremes. Research may be
publicly or privately funded, performed by a public
or private institution and the innovation produced
may be proprietary or in the public domain. Nor is it
easy to state a location, as private agricultural R&D
is now the province of a few huge multinationals
with global reach, noted above. Thus, any simple
statement tends to be inaccurate.
Pray et al. (2007) start from the fact that private
expenditures are now larger than public in most indus-
trialized countries. They outline the history of private
research in the developing counties, where plantations
(tea, rubber) and processors (tobacco) played a major
role. Similarly, haciendas in Latin America were large
enough to finance R&D as were sugar plantations
such as Lonrho in Africa. Pray et al. (2007) estimate
that in 1995 private R&D in Asia and Latin America
was only 10 per cent of the total, but rising. In SSA
it is lower, but not non-existent even in the late
1980s (Thirtle & Echeverria 1994). South Africa is
the exception, owing to Monsanto’s involvement in
maize and cotton. Pray et al. (2007) report 525 field
trials of GM crops in Africa, as compared with 1235
in Latin America and only 243 in Asia, as of 2003.
This is a better indicator than expenditures forPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)South Africa, as Monsanto does most of its R&D in
the US. Total global R&D is estimated at US$33-
35 billion per annum by the mid 1990s, with a bit
over one-third spent by the private sector. Public
R&D split about evenly between DCs and LDCs,
but 94 per cent of private R&D was in the DCs. How-
ever, as noted, the location of the R&D and the use of
the innovation can easily be as far apart as California
and KwaZulu Natal.(b) Biotechnology and incentives
The growing importance of private R&D activity is
closely associated with biotechnology and GM crops
for two reasons. GM crops account for much of the
private sector activity in LDCs and Monsanto is the
dominant player, responsible for 39 of the 54 GM
events that have been approved for commercial use.
The great majority of these involve Bt or herbicide tol-
erant (or both) soy, maize or cotton. Technically, the
development of genetic markers played a key role in
moving the public–private boundary as they allowed
the identification of specific traits in biological material
that were not previously possible. Hence, patenting
became possible more widely and the courts pushed
the process forward with decisions in favour of patent-
ing. Changes in the US law in 1980 were important as
the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision allowed patent-
ing in a case where living organisms were involved
(actually an oil eating bacterium that General Electric
wanted to patent). Cohen and Boyer were awarded a
US patent for their work on recombinant DNA and
the Bayh–Dole Act allowed grant recipients, such as
universities, to apply for patents on federally funded
research. Other DCs followed and in the 1990s the
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) globalized the protection of intellectual prop-
erty (Wright et al. 2007). Many LDCs were
unhappy, but had to accept TRIPS in order to keep
the advantages of WTO membership.
The technology problem has always been that
patents help push the resources committed to R&D
towards an optimum, but slow the diffusion of the
innovations, given they are frequently non-rival in con-
sumption. Excludability is at odds with maximizing
welfare in the case of a non-rival good. Wright et al.
(2007) compare patents and other means of providing
incentives to innovation, such as prizes and contracts.
The means of protecting intellectual property rights
(IPRs) in agriculture, such as plant patents, plant breed-
ers’ rights, utility patents, trade secrets, trademarks and
geographical indicators vary in terms of protection
levels. There are also alternatives to IPRs, such as
hybrid varieties, genetic use restriction technologies,
contractually defined rights over tangible property,
and mergers and acquisitions. The results are similar
in that the trend is towards concentration.
Thus, a consequence of extending patents to plants,
in combination with the huge costs of biotechnology
research is that the NARS, whose size led to their
ascendancy over small private seed companies in the
past century, are losing ground to massive multi-
nationals. Herdt et al. (2007) note the concentration
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than half a dozen such companies. Biotechnological
discoveries and enabling technologies are patented,
and since genetic improvement is a derivative process,
each incremental improvement adds a further layer of
IP constraints. Mergers increase a company’s IP port-
folio, giving it more freedom to operate and hence an
advantage over smaller rivals. The building blocks
and the tools all come with IP constraints and are com-
mercially useful only to companies with portfolios
covering most inputs. For example, Golden Rice
required 40 patents and six material transfer agree-
ments (MTAs). De Janvry et al. (2000) report that
whereas in 1994, 77 per cent of patents for Bt were
held by individuals and independent biotech compan-
ies, by 1999 six multinational companies (MNCs)
held 67 per cent of Bt patents, 77 per cent of which
were by the acquisition of smaller firms.
The level of difficulty in terms of legal costs and
simply having any idea of what to patent or otherwise
protect is increasingly putting agricultural research
beyond the reach of most potential producers. North
(1990) explains the importance of institutions that
give the correct incentives by pointing out that
throughout history, except for the past couple of hun-
dred years and in limited parts of the world, the
norm has been rent seeking and directly unproductive
activities aimed at redistribution rather than prod-
uction. Adam Smith’s invisible hand is the exception
not the rule, and legal activities are almost redistribu-
tional by definition. Thus, the scientific revolution in
agriculture is in danger of sinking into the mire of
rent seeking, with the growth potential snuffed out.
So it is Wright et al. (2007) who argue that decentra-
lized ownership of IP and high transactions costs can
lead to an ‘anti-commons’ phenomenon in which
innovations with fragmented IP rights are underused.
The evidence is sparse and largely anecdotal, but
they do not reject the possibility that IPRs do prevent
progress in agricultural technologies, much as they
have in pharmaceuticals.
In terms of forecasting, it seems probable that the
tangle of IPRs will get worse as time passes. The con-
centration in technology production is unlikely to be
reversed and the international organizations of the
CGIAR are likely to finish second to the multi-
nationals. This leaves a vision of a world of
oligopolistic competition or collusion in agricultural
innovations. The objective functions of Monsanto
and its competitors may not be totally incompatible
with that of the CGIAR, but they are surely not the
same. Any MNC has to protect its own position,
make profits and satisfy its shareholders, whereas the
CGIAR should have poverty reduction and adequate
nutrition for the poorest at the top of its agenda.
Since there is a strong negative correlation between
profitability and ending poverty, it is unlikely that the
MNCs can be at the forefront of poverty reduction.5. ESTIMATES OF THE AGRICULTURAL
INVESTMENTS NEEDED TO END HUNGER
By 2050, the world population is expected to grow by
40 per cent (from 6.5 to 9.1 billion) and allowing forPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)increased incomes and changes in diet, global
demand for food, feed and fibre is expected to grow
by 50 per cent by 2030 and 70 per cent by 2050
(Bruinsma 2009). There are a wide range of estimates
of demand and supply, but most consider that
although demand can be met, some intervention will
be required to ensure that supply keeps up and thus
prices rises are prevented. More will be required to
reduce poverty and move towards the FAO’s stated
aim of ending world hunger by 2050.
The conventional wisdom that the very high RORs
to agricultural R&D indicate underinvestment implies
that increasing investment is an economically efficient
way of increasing food output and decreasing hunger.
Beintema & Elliot (2009) suggest that the current yield
growth rate of about 1 per cent can be increased to its
historical level of about 2 per cent by increasing invest-
ments in the LDCs. The estimate in this paper is that
the compound growth rate needed to increase output
by 70 per cent over the next 40 years is 1.34 per
cent per annum. If the output elasticity of agricultural
R&D is as low as 0.05, which is the bottom end of the
range of estimates (see Nin Pratt & Fan (2009), dis-
cussed below), then this crude approach suggests
that with a US$36 000 million world total for R&D,
a 6.8 per cent increase would take growth from 1 per
cent to 1.34 per cent and this would cost about
US$2500 million per annum. Von Braun et al.
(2008) use a lower estimate of current output
growth, 0.53 per cent per annum, and calculate that
an extra US$5000 million of R&D investment in the
LDC NARs and the CGIAR would be needed to
raise this to 1.55 per cent per annum. Using the
more pessimistic R&D elasticity and without the tar-
geting of expenditures, a 20 per cent increase of
US$7200 million extra R&D investment would be
needed to increase output growth by 1 per cent per
annum. These figures give a good indication of the
magnitudes involved, against which other estimates
can be judged.
Tweeten & Thompson (2008) estimate that cereal
demand will grow at 1.17 per cent per annum, giving
an increase of 79 per cent by 2050. With linear yield
growth projected to be 1.07 per cent per annum,
giving 71 per cent more output implies excess
demand at current prices and they estimate that real
prices would rise by 44 per cent. They assume no
area expansion, so all the increase in output must
come from yields. Estimates by Rosegrant et al.
(2008) show that cereal demand increased by 0.9 per
cent per annum, giving a total increase of 56 per
cent, or 1.048 billion tons. After allowing for expansion
of planting, and irrigation offset by an average diversion
to biofuels, their yield gain estimates are 14 per cent
lower, resulting in excess demand that increases rice
prices by 60 per cent and wheat and maize by over
90 per cent (from Fisher et al. 2009). To prevent this
outcome Rosegrant et al. (2008) estimate that a 13
per cent per annum increase in public investment,
especially in R&D, would produce a 0.4 per cent per
annum increase in output, which would lower prices
enough to halve the number of malnourished children.
Under reasonable assumptions on R&D elasticities,
von Braun et al. (2008) calculate the impact of LDC
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2005 US$ per annum to nearly 10 000 million 2005
US$ by 2013. In the first scenario, where investments
are allocated to maximize output (by equalizing the
marginal return to R&D across regions), the impact
of seven years of doubled R&D (US$35 000 million
total) is a 1 per cent increase in output by 2020 and
a reduction of the number of people in $1 per day pov-
erty of 203 million. The bulk of the increased R&D is
allocated to East, South-East and South Asia, which
have the highest R&D elasticities. If poverty reduction
is the target, much more is allocated to SSA and South
Asia and by 2020 output is increased by 0.58 per cent,
but the number taken out of $1 per day poverty is
282 million. In SSA 144 million would be taken out
of $1 per day poverty, practically halving the poverty
rate, from 48 per cent to 25 per cent. For South
Asia, the equivalent figure is 124 million, with the
poverty rate reduced from 35 per cent to 26 per cent.
This work is an early report from an ambitious
ongoing project on ‘best bet’ programmes to be
scaled up in the future strategy of the CGIAR insti-
tutions (von Braun et al. 2009). The latest estimate
on the R&D requirements is Nin Pratt & Fan (2009)
who have refined their earlier work. They review the
evidence on R&D and poverty elasticities and deter-
mine the required investment in LDC NARS and
the CGIAR and its regional allocation, in order to
maximize output growth or minimize poverty. They
show that to maximize output growth, R&D invest-
ment should be mainly in South-East and South
Asia, but if poverty reduction is the aim then SSA
and South Asia should be particularly targeted.6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the productivity slowdown in
the DCs and its impact on the prospects for pro-
ductivity growth in the LDCs. It questions the
existence of such a slowdown, pointing out that
although yield growth has slowed in aggregate,
labour productivity growth varies and TFP has
improved in most regions. To the extent that there is
a break in the trends for all measures, it comes in the
mid 1980s, which fits with the new FAO data showing
that the long fall in food prices practically ceased from
this time (Piesse & Thirtle 2009).
The paper stresses the interactions between DCs
and LDCs, between public and private R&D and
between sectors, as countries such as China and
India have reached the transitional stage where indus-
try and urbanization have taken the leading role in the
growth process. Similarly, agriculture not only reacts
to the oil price because of fertilizer, fuel and transport
costs, but has become a part of the energy industry,
owing to the rapidly growing demand for biofuels.
This is a challenge and opportunity for the LDCs, as
well as a threat.
Although the food price crisis generated pleas for
increased funding, the economic downturn will mean
that few donors will increase funding for public
R&D. So, Monsanto and the other multinationals
will continue to account for a growing share of total
R&D funding. Thus, the gene revolution will lackPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)the public sector agenda that led to the green revolu-
tion having a poverty focus. Private companies must
operate where profits can be made and this precludes
the least resource rich, the most marginal and the
most distant farming areas. The prospects for growth
may well be better than those for poverty reduction.
The public sector and the international institutions
increasingly have to find a way through the growing
tangle of IPRs that threaten what used to be a GPG.
This is unfortunate, as in the past agricultural prod-
uctivity has been an important source of poverty
reduction as it helps the rural poor increase their wel-
fare directly and also helps the urban poor by lowering
food prices. Perhaps the reform of the CGIAR may
help alleviate this potential loss by extending the role
its institutions play in spreading the green revolution
(Pingali & Kelley 2007). These problems will be
exacerbated by climate change, as both higher temp-
eratures and a rise in sea levels will hit tropical
LDCs hardest.
Against this gloom, there is the fact that SSA is
finally making slow progress, so that some of the poor-
est are likely to benefit. However, it is probably not
possible to generate sufficient food output or incomes
in much of SSA to feed the population at all ade-
quately. Higher up the income distribution, more
countries are reaching the turning point in the struc-
tural transformation, when agricultural labour
productivity rises as a result of labour being withdrawn
from agriculture. Agriculture has to provide both food
and labour for industrialization. If it succeeds it trans-
forms itself and the country joins the ranks of the
industrialized, urbanized group with greater prosper-
ity. If it fails, it holds back industrialization and
urbanization and slows the development process. So,
for LDCs at all levels, there are prospects of prod-
uctivity growth, but those with very little
technological capacity will be disadvantaged. Increas-
ing labour productivity is the norm for the
industrializing countries, but it is SSA where both
labour productivity growth and employment need to
increase, and this is where biggest regional challenge
lies. Increasing yields will also be needed if agriculture
is to meet world demand for both food and energy.
This competition for agricultural output will
re-emerge as the recession eases and China and
India resume their rapid growth and transformation.
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Biofuels: the use of agricultural output for ethanol and
biodiesel.
Biological technical change: yield enhancing technologies that
increase the fertilizer responsiveness of plants and thus
increase yields.
Data envelopment analysis: a non-parametric approach to
constructing efficiency frontiers using linear program-
ming techniques.
Elasticity: in this paper, the proportional change in output
resulting from a proportional increase in R&D. Using
proportional changes makes the elasticity a pure
number; it does not vary with units of measurement
and is comparable across studies.
Golden rice: vitamin E enhanced rice developed by the Rock-
erfeller Foundation.
Green revolution: general term for increased yields due to
improved plant varieties introduced from the 1960s,
especially in Asia.
Index number techniques: index number theory is used in the
accounting approach to measuring total factor pro-
ductivity, by construction rather than estimation.
Internal rate of return: the rate of return on investments in
R&D, found by discounting the value of future output
increases.
Land productivity: a partial productivity measure, in that it is
with respect to only one of several inputs. Used in
this paper to mean the value of output per unit of
land, as opposed to crop yield, which is measured in
physical terms. This allows for enterprise switching,
say from low value crops to high value activities like
poultry.
Labour productivity: the other most common partial pro-
ductivity measure, which is output per unit of labour, or
the average product of labour.
Malmquist index: an index of total factor productivity derived
from the DEA approach, which does not require input
prices.
Marginal productivity: the increment in output gained when
an input is increased by one unit. Most importantly, in
a competitive market, the wage is equal to the marginal
product of the last unit of labour hired.
Marginal return: the return to the last or marginal unit of an
input.
Mechanical technical change: the substitution of machinery
and equipment for labour, which has transformed
labour productivity in the developed countries.
Production function: the relationship between output and the
inputs used to produce it.
Random coefficients: estimation method developed by Swamy
and used for panel data. The groups are estimated as sep-
arate entities and the final coefficients are the group
means. This is used to generate land and labour produc-
tivities for Africa and Asia, where it is an average of the
individual country results.
Rent seeking: economic activity that does not increase output.
Such activities are simply redistributing the pie to the
advantage of the protagonist and are therefore also
known as directly unproductive activities.
Returns to R&D: the increases in output or productivity that
can be attributed to R&D expenditures.
Supply response: the increase in output resulting from an
increase in the output price, which is usually measured
as an elasticity.
Total factor productivity: output per unit of all inputs, appro-
priately weighted to account for their relative importance.
